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BY

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MARSHALL TO BRADLEY TO SULLIVAN: WHAT DID THEY SEE?

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ABSTRACT

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
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Every Chief of Staff of the United States Army has had his own vision for the institution. This paper examines the visions of three Chiefs of Staff of the Army during periods of significant change. It studies the visions of General of the Army George C. Marshall, General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, and General Gordon R. Sullivan. The paper sets forth a set of critical vision factors and a vision analysis model to determine the impact of their visions on the institution. It argues that the budget is the single factor that allows the vision to impact the institution while training and doctrine are the two factors that can be impacted in the absence of Congressional dollars.



MARSHALL TO BRADLEY TO SULLIVAN



WHAT DID THEY SEE?



*... Vision without action is merely a dream,
... Action without vision merely passes the time,
... Vision with action can change the world.
Joel Barker¹*

INTRODUCTION

"A purpose, a goal, a personal agenda, a legacy, a dream, or a vision"²--how does an organization produce a statement in order to focus its mission now and into the future. The words above have been used in varied ways to express how organizations express their own statements to the public and their workers. Over the years, the Army has progressed from a simple purpose to a full blown futuristic vision. How, then, does the Army define vision? It is best defined this way - "a forward looking, idealized image of itself and its uniqueness."³

The purpose of this paper is to collect and analyze the visions of three Army Chiefs of Staff during periods of significant change. Those selected are General of the Army George C. Marshall (1939-1945); General of the Army Omar N. Bradley (1948-1949); and General Gordon R. Sullivan (1991-1995). I will assess

¹ Goldstein, Nolan, and Peelfer, *Applied Strategic Planning: How To Develop A Plan That Really Works*, New York, 1993, p. 39.

² Ibid., p. 38.

³ Ibid., p. 37.

their visions in terms of the vision factors of organizational structure, modernization, training, doctrine, and technology in order to determine what impact their visions had on the institution. Initially my assessment of these factors excluded budget as a given factor, however, as my research continued, it became clear that no matter what the vision, its impact on the organization was directly apporportioned to the budget that the Army received from Congress during that particular period. Therefore, I have decided to include it as a critical factor. In fact, it is the rope that binds the remaining factors together eventually determining their ability to impact the institution. These factors are shown below:




Figure 1. Critical Vision Analysis Factors

In order to determine the impact on the organization, the critical factors as espoused by each Chief of Staff will be assessed in terms of the Vision Analysis Model shown below:




Figure 2. Vision Analysis Model

The Model will examine six questions related to the visions analyzed:

- 1) How did the vision address the organizational structure and what impact did that have on the institution?
- 2) How did the impact of world issues affect the vision?
- 3) Was the Army/Chief of Staff in control of the destiny of the institution?
- 4) Did budget reductions mandate the vision?
- 5) Did the vision provide direction for a better Army both in terms of the ability to conduct war and personal satisfaction?

6) Was jointness a reality in the vision?

With a set of critical analysis factors and a model to determine vision impact on the institution, I looked at each of the Chiefs of Staff selected for assessment.



George Catlett Marshall
Chief of Staff
1939-1945



George Catlett Marshall

General of the Army George Catlett Marshall, Junior was born in Uniontown, Pennsylvania on 31 December 1880. He was educated at the Virginia Military Institute where he graduated with a BA degree and a commission in 1901. He had a number of short assignments from 1902 to 1924 ranging from the Philippines, instructor at Fort Leavenworth, duty on the General staff, culminating in aide-de-camp to General Pershing. He was on the staff of the Army War College and commanded the 8th Infantry Regiment. In 1938, he was appointed to head the War Plans Division in Washington and, later, that year became the deputy chief of staff. On 1 September 1939, he was appointed Chief of Staff of the Army. His only drawback appeared to be the fact that he "suffered from the lack of an opportunity to command large bodies of troops in the field and the lack of any need to think in terms of international relations."⁴

General Marshall was pushed ahead of many more senior generals to become the Chief of Staff. He had little command experience viewed as the primary prerequisite for the job. How would he do? The next few paragraphs will provide you with a critical analysis of his performance using the factors shown in Figure 1.

⁴ Forest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall, Education of a General, 1880-1939*, New York, 1963, p. 347.

General of the Army Marshall's Vision for the Army:

An Army "prepared to protect the United States and our overseas possessions against any external attack or raid, and the prevention of the domination of any territory in the Western Hemisphere by any overseas power."⁵ It must be:

- ☆ capable of meeting the defense needs of the United States,
- ☆ equipped with an "adequate supply of munitions, meaning arms, ammunition, and equipment",⁶
- ☆ capable of training an expanding army,
- ☆ utilizing the assets of an "organized and partially trained National Guard."⁷

Organizational Structure. In 1939, General Marshall took over an ineffective Army. During the post war period, continuous budget cuts had reduced the Army to a third rate power. "The basic army organizations of World War I remained: The battalions, regiments, divisions, corps, and armies, based in the main on the triangular as opposed to the square concept."⁸ The United States had no field army. It consisted of merely three and one-half square divisions at approximately fifty (50) percent strength. There were virtually no corps troops,

⁵ Address of General George C. Marshall to the Reserve Officers Association on February 16, 1940.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Volume An-Az, *Encyclopedia Britanica*, New York, 1995, p. 357.

almost no army troops or no general headquarters special troops. The Army Air Corps consisted of only sixty-two (62) tactical squadrons.⁹ He began his tenure with an authorized strength of 172,000. The General Headquarters was organized the same as General Pershing had organized in 1920. At its peak (1943), the strength of the Army grew to 8,300,000 with 89 divisions.

Modernization. The Army of '39 had equipment that was in large measure obsolete. It had 34 year old rifles and obsolete artillery. It lacked antitank and antiaircraft materiel, had no reserve of ammunition, and lacked airplanes. By 1943, considerable progress in the production of light and medium tanks, scout cars, and cross country personnel carriers had been made. It also saw the production of antiaircraft weapons, semi-automatic weapons, and great strides in the production of artillery (105 mm/155 mm/8 in./240 mm howitzers).

Training. Training in the peacetime Army did not exist especially field training. According to General Marshall's 1939 Biennial report, training was assessed as follows:

"For the past five years field training had been limited to the assembly of the four paper organizations, called field armies, once every four years, and then only for a two week period, of which about five days could be devoted to very limited action due to the lack of motor transportation and the unseasoned state of the National Guard personnel. This system, together with a general lack of corps troops, heavy artillery, engineers, medical regiments, signal battalions, quartermaster truck trains, and a complete lack of corps headquarters and

⁹ Report on the Army, Biennial Reports of General George C. Marshall, July 1, 1939 to June 30, 1943 to Secretary of War, p. 3.

experienced higher headquarters made it virtually impossible for the mobile combat troops of the regular Army to be prepared as an immediately available combat force, experienced in the technique of large-scale field operations.”¹⁰

Doctrine. Little was written in terms of operational doctrine as we know it today. The first Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, was published during 1939. This manual focused on structure, concepts, and principles. During FY 1941, the Army extended its training on a scale never before attempted during peacetime. It conducted large scale training exercises with two armies -- the first since the Civil War. This training initiative resulted in Marshall’s doctrine manual derived largely from the lessons learned from the Louisiana Maneuvers in 1942. These lessons included incorporating combined arms, coordinating air and ground operations, and logistical support. This was accomplished partly due to Marshall’s reorganization of the General Headquarters. This reorganization created a nucleus in the General Headquarters responsible for the direction of training and doctrine. His primary objective was the preparation of units “to take the field on short notice ready to function effectively in combat.”¹¹

Technology. Technology had been advancing for last 20 years much to the blind eyes and empty pockets of the Army. The Army had watched but done little to improve itself.

“Technological development was wrought with staggering changes in the character of armies and the nature of warfare. The most obvious was the

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 4.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 26.

increased firepower, despite a general reduction in numerical strength of individualized units, and mechanization, which was based primarily on the internal combustion engine and the tank."¹²

Jointness. In 1939, little jointness existed in the Army. Several joint boards were created between the Army and Navy such as the Joint Army and Navy Committee on Recreation and Welfare. In 1941, General Marshall participated in the writing of the National Security Act which was enacted after his tenure in 1947. In 1943, jointness existed in the form of the wartime allied supreme headquarters created in Europe. The interrelation of army, air force and naval forces gave rise to joint headquarters which included representatives from all three services. In each of the several theaters of operations the Allies created supreme headquarters which were both joint and allied. Other joint boards between the Army and the Navy such as the Joint Army and Navy Committee on Recreation and Welfare were created. Certainly, it was not the jointness expected today, however, it was a beginning.

Budget. As it is today, The Army budget was suffering from more pressing budget issues. The budget had made little progress since 1920. General Marshall was unable to do much with the budget until it was inevitable war was on the horizon.

"By 1943 , the Army received more than \$8 billion, which was more than it had received in the previous twenty years. As had been in the past, it was felt that money could make up for the time required to prepare the troops for a new and

¹² Volume An-AZ, *Encyclopedia Britannica*, New York, 1995, p. 357.

more complex form of warfare. This is a bad American habit: Throw money at the problem and it will be solved."¹³

Impact of General Marshall's vision on the Army. General Marshall inherited an Army that was "undermanned, ill equipped, poorly trained and tended to be bureaucratic."¹⁴ He built a plan to organize, equip and train the Army for a threat that he knew existed, however, because of pressing domestic issues the Congress failed to allocate the funds necessary. As the threat intensified, Congress and the national will of the people began to change, thereby allocating the resources for the Army.

Marshall's vision provided for several significant changes to occur in the Army. He reorganized the organizational structure of the Army as it expanded from 172,000 to nearly 8,300,000 soldiers. He began with three square divisions at less than 50 percent strength and grew to an army of 89 divisions at its peak. He was able to reorganize the General Headquarters structure of the Army for the first time since 1920.

His most significant impact was on training. He built a training program that revitalized not only the Regular Army but also the National Guard. He

¹³ Dunnigan and Macedonia, *Getting It Right: American Military Reforms After Vietnam to the Gulf War and Beyond*, New York, 1993, p. 42.


¹⁴ Colonel Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., *Military Strategists: Past and Present*, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, p. 278.

undertook a wide revision of training literature, revising 60 field manuals and 160 technical manuals as well as completely revising the Army Correspondence Course Program. He rebuilt the pilot and mechanic training programs. He was able to get the expanding Army beyond individual training to in field training from division to army level. He did this by establishing Army training under one department in the General headquarters and by establishing the Desert Training Center (March 1942), the Amphibious Training Center (May 1942), and the Mountain Training Center (September 1942). The Desert Training Center with its 30,000 square miles allowed for the freedom of large scale maneuvers. In addition to these, there were also large maneuver areas in Tennessee, Oregon, and Louisiana. During his tenure, the Army conducted the largest field maneuver exercises ever undertaken during peacetime. Out of this period also came the first doctrinal manual, FM 100-5, *Operations*, (1942 version). It was noted for its clarity.


Marshall had a strategic vision of the Army that would support the defense needs of the United States. He knew much earlier that the threat to the United States would require a large army to serve this nation. He was able to sell his vision to the President and the Congress. It is significant to note that he was not in control of the Army's destiny since the budget dictated what progress he was able to make toward his vision. The Army expanded so rapidly it lacked the

ability to promulgate the vision to the individual soldier. The only thing soldiers focused on was winning the war. General Marshall began to deal with jointness, however, it was not as we know it today.

Marshall realized his vision in many respects: organizational structure, training, and doctrine. His vision was largely driven by World War II and the support the American people had for that effort. His vision focused on the nations self-defense. This vision was easily linked to World War II as the war began to expand toward the shores of the United States. One could only imagine what impact his vision would have had without the war. On the other hand, the impact his vision had is obvious--he fielded the largest Army ever used by the United States during war.



Omar Nelson Bradley
Chief of Staff
1948-1949



Omar Nelson Bradley

"General Omar Nelson Bradley was born 12 February 1893 the son of a schoolteacher who died when Omar was thirteen. Bradley sold newspapers and went to work for the railroad. A Sunday-school teacher suggested that he try for West Point. He graduated from there in the class of 1915, along with Dwight D. Eisenhower, whom he outranked--44th to 61st--in a class of 164. Between then and 1940 Bradley rose through the ranks until shortly before World War II he was on duty on the General Staff. In 1943, he was assigned to succeed General George S. Patton, Jr., as Commander of the Second Corps in Tunisia and Sicily. He went on to become Commander of the First Army in the invasion of Normandy and Commanding General of the Twelfth Army Group in the battles of France, Belgium, Holland, and Germany--the largest command in American history. After the war he served as head of the Veterans Administration, and in 1948 became Army Chief of Staff, succeeding General Eisenhower.¹⁵

General Bradley appeared to much more prepared to become Chief of Staff. He had commanded and had already held a cabinet level position within the administration. How would he do?

¹⁵ William S. White, *Bradley Speaks Softly But Carries A Big Stick*, The New York Times Magazine, 14 August 1949, p. 297.

General of the Army Bradley's Vision for the Army:

- ☆ **An Army organized and capable of preparing forces, active and reserve, for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land. It must provide occupation forces for former enemy and liberated countries, provide forces for United Nations commitments, and provide assistance to Western Hemisphere and other friendly foreign nations. It must be capable of:**
- ☆ **maintaining supremacy in research and development,**
- ☆ **increasing the morale of all soldiers,**
- ☆ **training all soldiers, active and reserve, through an active recruiting program such as Universal Military training, and**
- ☆ **federalizing command and control of the National Guard.**

Organizational Structure. From Marshall's victorious Army, three short years later, General Bradley inherited an Army that had almost no combat effectiveness. The actual strength was 552,000 even though the authorized strength was 669,000. It consisted of ten understrength divisions. However, only one division was combat ready. "Actually, the Army of 1948 could not fight its way out of a paper bag."¹⁶ Eighteen months later, the actual strength of the Army declined.

¹⁶ Bradley and Blair, *A General's Life*, New York, 1983, p. 474.

Modernization. Equipment on hand averaged five or more years of age and was entirely of World War II origin. Overhaul and rebuild was limited to the scarce funds on hand. Research and development was conducted through a contract with John Hopkins University. The objective of the program was improving weapons, tactics, strategy and logistics of the future.

Training. Training plans were based on the assumption that Universal Military Training (UMT) would pass Congress. UMT was designed to supply an adequate number of soldiers for the reserve forces. UMT is defines as follows:

"every physically and mentally able young man in the country would be conscripted to serve about six months' military service. During that period they would receive basic training and some specialized training. This would result in a great pool of trained military manpower in order to create a viable Army reserve."¹⁷

Selective Service continuation was a fall back as the Army was in desperate need for personnel. Initial plans called for an increase in training divisions from 4 to 23-a compromise would be 8. Unit training was restricted to company and battalion level with cross leveling of regimental personnel in order to field a complete unit. Smaller scale maneuver exercises replaced all full-scale maneuver corps exercises. Training had almost reverted to the same status as it was in 1939--barely existent. The training burden remained on the shoulders of a small corps of active officer and enlisted trainers.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 482.

Doctrine. In 1948, the emphasis in doctrine remained on "conventional warfare, improving coordination of fire support including close in support, offensive action, and the infantry division. A study of World War II operations convinced many military men that the best antitank weapon was another tank."¹⁸

Technology. A concerted effort was put forth to place technology advancements under one hat. A research and development group was formalized to find solutions to research and development as well as a coordination medium for the Army. An attempt was made to form a technical reference service to pool scientific and technical information, but due to the lack of funds, it never materialized. Projects were underway in the following areas: air transport, aerial resupply, antiaircraft weapons, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air-missiles, and a superior line of armored vehicles.

Jointness. The National Security Act of 1947 is credited with the first attempt to reorganize the war department with the intention of unifying the services. It established the National Security Council, the Defense Department and made the Air Force a separate service. This unification effort was based on mutual cooperation and interdependence which resulted in near mutiny among the services especially the Navy and the Air Force. Certainly most arguments

¹⁸ Dunnigan and Macedonia, *Getting It Right, American Military Reforms after Vietnam to the Gulf War and Beyond*, New York, 1993, p. 274.

centered around money or the lack thereof. General Bradley had some initial reservations about the National Security Act of 1947 because it established the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as an informal position with no vote. He viewed it as having little power and as the lines began to be drawn between the Services, he believed that the position must be strengthened to be able to handle issues like the developing mutiny of the Navy and Air Force. After Congress strengthened the Act, General Bradley said "upon reflection it did not seem fitting that the Air Force should have first crack at this prestigious job. All in all, the best bet appeared to be a neutral Army general of some public stature."¹⁹ General Bradley appeared to be somewhat self-serving because he turned down the job under the initial act. He did this because it was not yet clear whether Truman would be thereby leaving him only to retire.

Budget. The budget had dropped to 4.8 billion in 1948, about half of the 1945 budget. These figures were vigorously debated on a daily basis and changed many times. The real issue with the budget was the Navy supercarrier and the differences among the services in how that was to be built, if at all.

¹⁹ Bradley and Blair, *A General's Life*, New York, 1983, p. 504.

Impact of General Bradley's Vision on the Army:

General Bradley's impact on the institution was limited by the fact that he spent on only eighteen months in office. His organizational plan called for growth from 10 to 25 divisions. He asked for an increase in Army strength to 837,000. In 1949, the peak strength of the Army was only 660,473. In fact, due to new budgetary restrictions, the Army continued on a downhill slide. His 25 division plan was not realized and the Army continued to struggle with the 10 understrength divisions.

Congress failed to enact General Bradley's vision of Universal Military Training. His efforts did result in the reenactment of the Selective Service System in 1948. This act had a great impact on the National Guard. Its size increased by nearly 60,000 as soldiers enlisted in the National Guard to avoid the draft. Unfortunately, it had little effect on the reserves.

The doctrine during this period reflected the World War II experience. Emphasis continued on conventional warfare, fire support, tanks on tanks, and the infantry division. FM 100-5, *Operations*, (1949) was a key doctrinal manual published during General Bradley's tenure. Its main different was its emphasis

on the use of tanks. It was obvious that they had been reading the German doctrinal manuals.

General Bradley was the first Army Chief of Staff to be faced with jointness as we know it today. The National Defense Act of 1947 created the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a separate United States Air Force. General Bradley was able to keep the Army on track and out of the near mutinies of the other services during this period. He did this by securing an Army position on the budget that was uncontested by the other services. Jointness, for the first time, was a reality at least on paper. It would take years to put any meaning in the word.

General Bradley's ability to realize his vision was limited by budget and his tenure in office. Other than his dealings with the National Defense Act of 1947, his most significant impact was the improvement of soldier morale by getting a pay raise through Congress. There is no evidence that the Army attempted to promulgate his vision to the institution. Unfortunately, General Bradley's vision had little impact on the institution.



Gordon R. Sullivan
Chief of Staff
1991-1995



Gordon R. Sullivan

General Sullivan entered the Army in 1959 as a student at the Armor Officer Basic School in Fort Knox. He received a BA degree from Norwich University and a MA degree from the University of New Hampshire. He served in a variety of command and staff positions in joint and allied assignments in the United States, Europe, Vietnam, and Korea. His assignments include Deputy Commandant, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Deputy Chief of Staff for Support, Central Army Group, Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, United States Army, and Vice Chief of Staff, Army. He became Chief of Staff, United States Army in June 1991.

General Sullivan became Chief of Staff of the Army immediately following its victory in the Persian Gulf. He came to the job with the appropriate prerequisites in command and staff. In fact, probably more than the other two, he came to the job best qualified. How well did he do?

General Sullivan's Vision for the Army:

A Total Force Trained and Ready to Fight...

Serving the Nation at Home and Abroad...

A Strategic Force capable of Decisive Victory.

Organizational Structure. General Sullivan inherited an Army in transition-- from a forward deployed Cold War Army to a Power Projection Army, from 18 active component divisions to 12, from 770,000 to 541,000 soldiers. The Army eliminated one corps, 6 active component divisions and two national guard divisions. The Army Reserve inactivated 339 units and reorganized/activated 507 others. When his tenure was complete, the Army had four corps, 12 active divisions, and eight national guard divisions. Even though they were not eliminated during his tenure, two other active divisions were identified for reduction. General Sullivan's vision would set the stage to reorganize what was left.

Modernization. General Sullivan build his modernization effort around five objectives: 1) rapidly project and sustain forces, 2) protect committed forces, 3) win the information war, 4) conduct precision strikes, and 5) dominate the maneuver battle. His program focused on two programs: 1) the RAH-66 Comanche helicopter which was needed for reconnaissance, security and economy of force. It was intended to replace a system that is well over 20 years old. The second is the 2) Advanced Field Artillery System/Future Armored Resupply Vehicle. This system was designed to give the Army a dramatic increase in artillery lethality, survivability, mobility, and operational capability. Budget constraints continued to hamper realization of his modernization effort.

Training. General Sullivan stated that training was the organizational glue that holds the Army together. It was his top peacetime priority. His focus was on Combat Training Centers exercises, joint and combined forces, simulations, and leader development. Included in his training priorities was implementation of the Reserve Components Training Development Action Plan. This plan calls for actions to improve and enhance Reserve Components training readiness. It identified issues that would effect a realistic and effective training program for the Reserve Components.

Doctrine. General Sullivan has dubbed doctrine as the "Army's engine of change." The Army again updated FM 100-5, *Operations*. It produced FM 100-6, *Information Operations*, FM 100-22, *Installation Management* and was the lead agency in 26 joint publications. Doctrine development was conducted in peace operations, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance operations.

Technology. General Sullivan, more than General Marshall or General Bradley faced a great challenge in technology advancement. Here too, however, General Sullivan had developed a plan. It was called the Army Technology Base Master Plan. Its purpose was to maintain technological superiority. Key to this

superiority was digitization of the battlefield, integration of information technologies, telemedicine, and space products.

Jointness. The National Security Act of 1947 simply had not brought about the changes the Congress thought necessary to bring the services together.

Therefore, in 1986, they enacted the Goldwaters-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. While this act had wide-ranging impact on many aspects of the Army, its intention was to enhance the power in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For the first time, the Army, as well as the other services, began to see their budgets being scrutinized by the Joint Staff. It put the services in the position of resource providers for the CINCs. This had a significant impact on how the Army was doing business.

Budget. By 1991, the budget had declined 36%. Not only had the Department of Defense budget declined, but the Army's share within the Department had declined as well.²⁰

Impact of General Sullivan's Vision on the Army:

²⁰ Dunnigan and Macedonia, *Getting it Right, American Military Reforms after Vietnam to the Gulf War and Beyond*, New York, 1993, p. 56.

General Sullivan designed the Army of the future--FORCE XXI, however, he was unable to settle the organizational structure of the Army. Budget constraints continued to reduce Army structure throughout his tenure. He was able to keep the Army as the Department of Defense leader in doctrine development. FM 100-5, *Operations* was republished to reflect the new vision and provide a roadmap for the Army of the 21st century. Some 100 joint regulations were published with the Army being the lead agency in 26.

Training was his number one priority with the Combat Training Centers as the lead element. He also put into place a program to increase realistic and effective training for the reserve components. Training base training was adequate , however, training seats went unfilled. For the first time, the All Volunteer force could not fill the ranks. Leader Development had made great strides and may be one of the greatest legacies of his tenure. The Combat Training Centers and the Battle Command Training Program put forth realistic combat conditions ensuring that our future leaders had the right training should the need arise.

Modernization was severely constrained due to budget constraints. Emerging technology added pressure as it was advancing faster than the budget could supply the needed funds. Even though, FORCE XXI is a technology based

structure, it remains to be seen how long it will take us to build it. Current estimates are 2013.

General Sullivan made considerable progress toward jointness, however, this was probably due more to the requirements of Goldwater-Nichols than the institutions desire to do so.

Budget hearings were filled with what can you give up--the peace dividend had to be paid. He did not see a budget increase during his tenure.

Better than any other Chief of Staff in history, General Sullivan was able to get his vision out to the Army. He did this through publications, speeches, posture statements and training.

His vision had a great impact on the institution as it set training and doctrine as the organizational glue and engine for the future. I believe that he realized that this was the only thing that he could truly influence.

Vision Analysis Model. Now that each vision has been broken down by critical vision factors, I will run them through the questions of the analysis model (each Chief of Staff will be rated on the green-amber-red scale):

1) How did the vision address the organizational structure and what impact did that have on the institution? General Marshall's organizational structure was reactive to World War II growing from 3 to 89 divisions at its peak. It was not as much Marshall's vision, but the war that drove the organizational structure. However, there was enormous growth and General Marshall did an outstanding job putting these units on the battlefield. General Bradley came into office with 10 divisions and left office with 10 divisions though his vision called for 25. General Sullivan went in with 18 divisions, left with 12, and was headed for 10. To his credit, he did design FORCE XXI even though it remained on paper at his departure. All in all, I would rate vision impact upon organizational structure as green for Marshall (World War II), red for Bradley (Interwar Years), and amber for Sullivan (Post Cold War).

2) How did the impact of world issues effect the vision? This question might more appropriately be stated as help or hinder. General Marshall could not have achieved what he did without World War II. General Bradley was effected more by the attempt at unification of the services and internal struggle that ensued than the world situation. In fact, the world situation kept him from expanding the Army. General Sullivan was a victim of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the

collapse of the former Soviet Union. Red for General's Bradley and Sullivan; green for General Marshall.

3) Was the Chief of Staff in control of the destiny of the institution? I do not believe that any of the Chiefs of Staff were in control of the destiny of the Army, even though, I believe that General Marshall may have been in a better position because of his direct relationship with the President and Congress. General Bradley had less of a relationship with the President than General Marshall and General Sullivan had even less. My judgment is that they were all red in this category.

4) Did the budget mandate the vision? Absolutely! This could be the independent variable upon which all others depend. All were affected by the budget the Army received, Marshall positively and Bradley and Sullivan negatively. General Marshall green - General's Bradley and Sullivan red.

5) Did the vision provide for a better direction for the Army both in terms of the ability to conduct war and personal satisfaction? All made significant improvements in the ability of the Army to conduct war. General Marshall's improvements in large scale and individual training, leader development, and doctrine proved to be beneficial in the outcome of World War II. Personal satisfaction was reasonably steady with each period having its time of anxiety due to demobilization, drawdowns and rightsizing. Given all the factors, this

category is where all of the Chiefs of Staff made their greatest contributions to their organizations. Therefore, all are green.

6) Was jointness a reality in the vision? General Marshall did see jointness in terms of the allied headquarters during the war but it was not the jointness expected of the National Security Act and Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act. General Bradley was the first Chief of Staff to realize what jointness was to eventually mean to the services. He put forth an effort to keep the Army on track and make the unification effort work. General Sullivan was in the middle of sorting out the effects of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. The Army is still trying to meet the requirements of this act. General Bradley made a great contribution here as he was able to get above the fight and see beyond. Therefore, General Bradley was green, General Sullivan was amber and General Marshall was red.

The model would lead you to believe that General Marshall did quite well and he did. However, without World War II he would have been rated the same as the other two. What the model says is that in order to have vision attainment you must clearly understand the American mood, i.e., Congress, the world situation, and the expected budget. In fact, the first two dictate the latter. Failure to realize this will leave your destiny in control of others. Realization of

this fact will allow you to develop a vision that is within the parameters of the budget. The vision then will be attainable in a sense that you can provide a direction for the organization that is attainable. If, then, it is attainable, personal satisfaction will be at an all time high.

Below is a recapitulation of the Vision Assessment Model:

Vision Analysis Model Assessment

	Marshall	Bradley	Sullivan
Organizational Structure	Stippled	Black	White
World Situation	Stippled	Black	Black
Control of Destiny	Black	Black	Black
Budget	Stippled	Black	Black
Better Direction	Stippled	Stippled	Stippled
Personal Satisfaction	Stippled	Stippled	Stippled
Jointness	Black	Stippled	White
Overall Impact	Stippled	Black	Black

Figure 3. Vision Assessment

Conclusion. The Vision Marshall, Bradley and Sullivan had for the Army was basically the same--an Army trained and ready to meet the needs of the Nation. The obstacles each faced were the same--the national will of the people and the United States Congress. Marshall would have realized little of his vision had it not been for World War II. History repeated itself for Bradley a mere three years later as he inherited an administrative Army. At least, General Sullivan was able to produce a roadmap for the Army to follow even though it reduces and it is yet to be seen whether his vision can be pursued. Ultimately, the visions of these three Chiefs of Staff were only as good as the budget they received.

It would seem, then, that there are only two factors that the Chief of Staff had control over which could effect the impact of his vision on the institution. One is doctrine. Each of the Chiefs of Staff made a significant contribution to doctrine. The other was training. It was one of the few things they could control. We can always train and we must never lose that edge.

In conclusion, all three of the Chiefs of Staff took office during periods of significant change. Marshall was able to overcome this by the onset of World War II, otherwise, he would have realized little. Bradley was limited by his short tenure and no perceived threat, Sullivan's visions hit the "Wall" and was victim

of the peace dividend. All three had visions for the Army but were unable to realize the dollars to impact the institution. General Reimer may be the first Chief of Staff to realize that vision attainment is dependent upon Congress by saying in his vision "...equipment the Country can provide..."²¹ However, based on the past, it might better be stated, ...equipment the Congress will allow...

²¹ The Army Vision, *Defense News*, Army, American on-line, 3 February 1996.

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